The grammar of thinking: Comparing reported thought and reported speech across languages


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**Workshop description**
Speakers may resort to a variety of linguistic strategies to report communicative acts (‘reported speech’ = RS) or mental states (‘reported thought’ = RT). While RS has received relatively much attention (Buchstaller & Alphen 2012; Güldemann & Roncador 2002; Janssen & Wurff 1996), RT is not often explicitly discussed. Authors either group RT together with RS as a type of ‘inner speech’ (Vygotsky 1987; Vološinov 1973), or treat it as a completely separate phenomenon. This is the case for formal semantic approaches to quotation and propositional attitudes, where RS more naturally fits the former category and RT the latter or and also for functionalist analyses of quotative meaning (Boye 2012).

Both positions have merit. From a syntactic viewpoint, structures involving RS and RT are roughly equivalent (Palmer 1986: 135; Spronck & Nikitina 2019). Moreover, both RS predicates (e.g. *say*, *tell*) and RT predicates (e.g. *think*) behave as bridge verbs allowing for a number of syntactic phenomena, including extraction across wh-questions, negation raising, embedded V2 in Germanic languages, and complementizer deletion (Cocchi & Poletto 2002, Dor 2005; Erteschik-Shir 1973; Vikner 1995; see also Salvesen & Walkden 2017). The structural resemblance is even greater in languages that do not make a lexical distinction between ‘say’ and ‘think’ at all, examples of which have been found on nearly all continents (Güldemann 2008; Larson 1978; Reesink 1993; Rumsey 1990; Saxena 1988; Spronck 2015).

Nevertheless, predicates of RS and RT may select different complementizers (see, e.g., Ledgeway 2005) or different moods in the embedded clause (see, e.g., Laca 2013). Functional, corpus-based analyses of RS/RT have revealed differences in preferred syntactic patterns with respect to word order, expression and omission of arguments and complementizers, and different preferences for hypotactic vs. paratactic constructions in colloquial speech (e.g., Posio & Pešková, to appear). Formalist accounts highlight differences in the syntactic structure of RS/RT complement clauses: the complement of RT predicates seems to lack an independent illocutionary force, while RS predicates select for clauses with a full structure licensing root phenomena (Heycock 2006; Hooper & Thompson 1973). Semantically, this difference has been related to the fact that only the complement of RS predicates constitutes an independent speech act. Differences also emerge in the grammaticalization/pragmaticalization processes out of predicates of RS/RT that yield different types of evidential and epistemic structures and markers such semi-grammaticalized constructions, parenthetical expressions, evidential or epistemic adverbial(s) (cf. English *methinks*, Spanish *dizque*, Greek *lei*), discourse markers and modal particles, and grammatical elements (e.g. complementizers) (Cruschina 2015; Cruschina & Remberger 2008; Thompson & Mulac 1991; Posio 2014; Wiemer 2018, and references therein).
The aim of the proposed workshop is to bring together linguists from different frameworks working on the relationship between RS and RT, and on their different linguistic manifestations. On the one hand, it continues the trend towards the joint analysis of categories of cognition and perspective, which in recent years has gained a strong presence in typology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. On the other, it also seeks to assess whether RT constitutes a separate category, RS/quotation or (other) attitudinal expressions. We seek to bring together scholars working on the analogies and differences between the two domains of RS and RT, embracing the investigation of their semantic, pragmatic and morpho-syntactic properties, as well as of the historical linguistic processes that lead to the emergence of RS (evidential) and RT (epistemic) markers. Ultimately, we aim to contribute to the understanding of the notions RS and RT, their crosslinguistic extent and their limitations, and to foster debate across theoretical divides and approaches.

The questions addressed in the workshop include (but are not limited to):

- Which morphosyntactic properties characterize RS and RT in individual languages or in a crosslinguistic sample?
- Should RT be treated as a distinct category? Which tests and criteria can be used to distinguish between the two domains both syntactically and semantically?
- Does complementation under RS/RT predicates involve different semantic and syntactic units and objects? Does complementation under RS/RT predicates involve different semantic and syntactic units and objects? Do the differences that have been observed in complement clauses align with RT/RS or rather with the distinction between assertive and non-assertive predicates?
- Can we identify patterns of polysemy between concepts of ‘saying’ and ‘thinking’?
- What differences and similarities in the expression of RS and RT can be found in corpus-based studies? Are such tendencies specific to individual languages or varieties or rather extend across languages?
- Are RT and RS subject to similar pragmatic constraints?
- What is the relationship between the different linguistic manifestations of RS and RT, including both full predicates and grammatical elements?
- Does RT differ from RS with respect to processes such as grammaticalization, pragmaticalization or also acquisition?
- Semantically, how does RT relate to quotation on the one hand and propositional attitudes on the other? Can RT be interpreted as ‘inner speech’?

We invite submissions that contribute to the description, discussion, and analysis of these and other issues concerning RS and RT in any language or in a typological/comparative perspective. We welcome contributions from all frameworks and approaches, including synchronic, diachronic, data-driven, corpora, discourse, typological, and theoretical analyses. Preliminary abstracts (300 words, as DOC and/or PDF file) should be sent to the workshop organizers (email address: <daniela.casartelli@helsinki.fi>) by 10 November 2019.

**Important Dates:**
10 November 2019: Deadline for submission of 300-word abstracts to organizers
20 November 2019: Submission of the workshop proposals to SLE
15 December 2019: Notification of acceptance of workshop proposals from SLE
15 January 2020: Deadline for submission of all abstracts to SLE for review
26–29 August 2020: SLE conference, University of Bucharest
References


