A surprising association and an unexpected move:
Mirative implicatures at the syntax-semantics interface*

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ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the mirative implicature that is associated with two distinct Romance constructions: Mirative Focus Fronting (MFF) and Doubly Inflection Construction (DIC). Despite the distinct level at which the mirative meaning is syntactically encoded in the two constructions, the mirative import displays consistent properties. Both in MFF and in DIC, this meaning can be captured as a conventional implicature about the falsity of the at-issue proposition in the most normal worlds. The modal parameters that are required to interpret the implicature are anchored to the world and time of utterance and to the conversational community; hence, this mirative implicature is not exclusively anchored to the speaker’s perspective, but it also involves the interlocutor(s) in the attempt to arrive at a joint evaluative commitment.

KEYWORDS
mirativity, conventional implicature, focus fronting, motion verb, stereotypical ordering source, expectations, evaluative commitment

1. Introduction

The grammatical category of mirativity refers to the linguistic expression of unexpectedness or exceeded expectations (see DeLancey 1997, 2001, Aikhenvald 2004, 2012, Peterson 2010, Rett 2011, Rett & Murray 2013, among others). In most instances, it is a speaker-oriented meaning, although it can alternatively be anchored to the expectations of the addressee or of a third-person ‘point of view holder’ (Aikhenvald 2004, 2012). Mirativity is generally conceived of as the expression of a purely subjective internal state, and consequently, it is contiguous to the category of expressive meaning (see Rett, this volume).

In this paper, we contend that not all kinds of mirative meanings are expressive in this sense. To this end, we will discuss two morphosyntactic constructions in Romance that convey a mirative import. On the one hand, we show that this import, like expressive meaning proper, belongs to a dimension of meaning distinct from at-issue meaning (Potts 2005, 2007). On the other, we argue that this mirative import differs crucially from expressives in that its interpretation is based on two conversational backgrounds (in the sense of Kratzer 1981 and subsequent work) which are under the cooperative control of the conversational participants: thus, the mirative import of our constructions is not purely expressive, but aims at establishing a joint evaluative commitment. Building on Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2016), we argue that when a mirative import is only anchored to the speaker, it requires backward shifting, that is,

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unexpectedness is relative to the speaker’s past expectations; when it is anchored to the conversational community, as in our constructions, no backward shifting is required.

More specifically, we will examine and compare the mirative import that can be associated with two distinct constructions. In the first one, the mirative meaning associates with a focus structure characterized by the fronting of the focus constituent, as shown in (1):

(1) Non ci posso credere! Due bottiglie ci siamo bevuti! (Italian)
not to-it= can.1SG believe.INF two bottles REF= be.1PL drunk
‘I can’t believe it! We drank two bottles!’

Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2015, 2016) argue that the mirative import is a conventional implicature that is encoded in the syntactic structure and is directly responsible for the triggering of focus fronting (see also Cruschina 2012, 2019, Frey 2010, Jiménez Fernández 2015a,b, and Trotzke 2017a,b). We label this construction Mirative Focus Fronting (henceforth MFF).

The second construction is a verbal periphrasis available in Sicilian which involves the motion verb go (Cardinaletti & Giusti 2001, 2003, Cruschina 2013, Di Caro 2019a, Del Prete & Todaro 2020) and can be used to express surprise and unexpectedness with respect to a past event (2):

(2) Arrivammo dda, nn'u ristoranti, e mi vannu (Sicilian)
arrive.PST.1PL there in-the restaurant and me.DAT= go.PRS.3PL
a dununu na pizza accussì ladia!
to give.PRS.3PL a pizza so ugly
‘We arrived there, at the restaurant, and they gave me such a bad pizza!’
(Cruschina 2013: 279)

The most striking formal characteristic of this construction is the double inflection, that is, both the verb go and the following lexical verb are inflected for the same features. In what follows it will be thus referred to as the Doubly Inflected Construction (henceforth DIC).

As pointed out by Peterson (2015, 2017), mirative meanings can be entailed or implicated, leading to the distinction between parasitic vs non-parasitic mirativity:

In cases where mirative meaning is not a part of the entailed meanings of the parts of the sentence, then mirativity is parasitic on these meanings. On the other hand, when a language possesses words or morphemes that specifically encode mirative meanings […] then mirativity is non-parasitic (Peterson 2017: 319).

The implicated mirative meanings of both MFF and DIC can thus be defined as parasitic, since they are not encoded by means of specific lexical items or of morphological elements

1 Notice that the focus constituent need not be fronted: the mirative interpretation is possible even if the focus stays in its it-situ position. Different solutions have been proposed to this optionality problem (see Rizzi 1997, Brunetti 2009, Gabriel 2010, Bianchi & Bocci 2012, and Bianchi 2019). In all of these accounts, factors other than interpretation are to be invoked as responsible for the surface position of the focus constituent. Under the alternative spell-out approach (see Bianchi & Bocci 2012), in fact, the problem does not really holds, in that it is proposed that FF always takes place, and that what is optional is where the moved constituent is pronounced: either in its base position, yielding in-situ focus, or in its landing site, giving rise to FF. Bianchi (2019) further refines this proposal by suggesting that the alternative spell-out of one copy or the other is regulated by interface constraints such as Scope Transparency vs (prosodic) unmarkedness.
belonging to a systematic paradigm, but rather depend on a specific structure: FF in the case of MFF and the motion verb construction with go in the case of DIC.²

The main goal of this paper is to compare the mirative implicature associated with the two constructions. Both MFF and DIC are associated with a similar implicature of surprise and unexpectedness, but only the first construction requires a narrow focus structure. We argue that in the first case, mirativity is encoded in the left periphery of the clause, above the focus projection, while in the case of the Sicilian DIC, the mirative content is associated with a functional verb within the extended domain of the vP. Despite this significant difference, we show that in both constructions, the mirative implicature is interpreted with respect to conversational backgrounds (modal base and ordering source) that are anchored not only to the speaker, but to all conversational participants.

In the following discussion, we intend to examine the nature of the implicature (conventional vs conversational) and the type of commitment that it give rise to: Does the mirative meaning imply surprise and unexpectedness for the speaker, for the addressee or for both? We also address the question of whether the property described as ‘sudden discovery’, ‘sudden revelation or realization’ (Aikhenvald 2012: 437) or ‘recency restriction’ (Rett & Murray 2013: 459) is a necessary condition for mirative meanings, as well as the question of the distinction between our mirative implicature and expressives (see also Rett this volume). From a theoretical and interface perspective, we ultimately want to arrive at a better understanding of the syntactic encoding of special pragmatic meanings.

2. MFF and its implicature

Mirative focus is a type of focus related to new information which is particularly surprising or unexpected (Cruschina 2012; see also Brunetti 2009). MFF is very common in (almost) all Romance varieties (Italian, Spanish, Romanian, Sicilian, Sardinian, Brazilian Portuguese, etc.), as well as in German (Frey 2010, Trotzke 2017a,b), as exemplified in (1) above and in (3):

(3) a. Pensa te! Col diretore voleva parlare! (Italian)
think you with-the manager wanted.3SG speak.INF
‘Guess what! He wanted to speak with the manager!’
(Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina 2015: 6)

b. ¡Por Dios, dos botellas se han bebido! (Spanish)
for God two bottles REFL= have.3PL drunk
‘My God! They have drunk up two bottles!’
(Jiménez-Fernández 2015a: 50)

Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2015, 2016) defines the mirative meaning associated with MFF as a conventional implicature that exploits the set of alternatives generated by the narrow focus. For example, in (3a) narrow focus on the fronted constituent yields a set of alternative propositions of the form: ‘she wanted to speak with x’ (for x an entity). The mirative import conveys that there is at least one member of the set of alternative propositions which is more likely than the asserted proposition. More explicitly, the authors characterize the mirative implicature as in (4):

² In what follows, we propose that both MFF and DIC mirativity is encoded in dedicated functional projections by features that could be conceived of as null morphological elements. Note, however, that these realizations are not productive and fully grammaticalized and have a limited domain of application, which is indeed highly dependent on a specific structure. See also Rett (2012) for a similar distinction in terms of ‘dependent’ vs ‘independent’ manifestations of mirativity.
(4) **Mirative Conventional Implicature (MFF)**

There is at least one focus alternative proposition which is more likely than the asserted proposition with respect to a contextually relevant modal base and a contextually relevant stereotypical ordering source.

The relative likelihood of the propositions is calculated on the basis of two conversational backgrounds, the modal base and the ordering source (Kratzer 1981, 1991, 2012). The former delimits the ‘logical space’ of the possible states of the world compatible with a given body of information. The stereotypical ordering source is a conversational background assigning to every world the set of propositions which represent the normal course of events in that world (Kratzer 2012 [1981]), on which speakers’ expectations are based; these propositions are used to rank the worlds of the modal base according to how close they are to the relevant stereotypical ideal. On this basis, the comparative likelihood of two propositions can be informally defined as follows:

(5) Given two propositions \( p, q \) that are consistent with a modal base \( B(w) \), \( p \) is more likely than \( q \) with respect to the modal base \( B(w) \) and the ordering source \( O(w) \) iff some world(s) in \( B(w) \) in which \( p \) is true and \( q \) is false is closer to the stereotypical ideal than all the worlds in which \( q \) is true and \( p \) is false (simplified from Kratzer 2012: 41).

This analysis provides a straightforward account of the relationship between focus and the mirative meaning: Unexpectedness is derived by the comparison in terms of likelihood of alternative propositions, and the alternative propositions are provided by the focus structure (in the sense of Rooth 1992).

In order to allow for a more comprehensive approach that can be later extended to the DIC, we propose a slightly different characterization of the mirative import which does not exploit the focal alternatives, but rather relies on a weak presuppositional analysis of narrow focus. Specifically, we assume that a narrow focus structure invites the hearer to accommodate the existential closure of the background (see Geurts & van der Sandt 2004 and Abush 2010): in (3a), for example, the existential closure amounts to the proposition that the customer wanted to speak with somebody. On the other hand, the at-issue proposition is associated with the following implicature:

(6) **Mirative Conventional Implicature (revised)**

The at-issue proposition is false in all the most normal worlds of the modal base \( B(w) \), where the most normal worlds are defined as those worlds that are not outranked by any other world in \( B(w) \) on the basis of the ordering determined by a contextually relevant stereotypical ordering source \( O(w) \).³ ⁴

Although the mirative implicature as defined in (6) no longer makes reference to focus alternatives, focus is by no means semantically idle. Note in fact that, while (6) characterizes the at-issue proposition as unlikely, the existential closure of the background is presupposed: the speaker thereby proposes that it be tacitly accommodated by the interlocutors. Crucially, such an accommodation can go through only if the proposition to be accommodated is not particularly controversial or noteworthy. To illustrate, consider again (3a): by using MFF, the speaker treats as ‘accommodatable’ the proposition that the customer wanted to speak with somebody, but marks as unlikely the proposition that she wanted to speak with the director.

⁴ The implicature could be based on ordering sources other than the stereotypical one, such as a bouletic ordering source, that is, according to wishes or desires (Kratzer 1991, 2012; see Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina 2016).
The combination of the existential presupposition and of the mirative implicature (6) thus foregrounds the focus as the ‘unexpected’ piece of information.

Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2015: 14–15, 2016) provides several pieces of evidence in favor of the claim that the mirative meaning of MFF is a conventional implicature (see Potts 2005, 2007). First of all, it is a speaker commitment and, unlike presuppositions, is not backgrounded, in that it is not already part of the common ground. Secondly, the mirative meaning cannot be denied by the speaker, as shown by the negative outcome of the cancellability test in (7) (see also Peterson 2017):

(7) Credevo che non sapessi cucinare, invece...
    thought.1SG that not was.able.SBJV.3SG cook instead
    il pollo tandoori ha preparato!
    the chicken tandoori has prepared
    ‘I thought he couldn’t cook, instead... he made tandoori chicken!
    # Ma la cosa non mi sorprende...
    but the thing not me=surprises
    ‘But that doesn’t surprise me.’

Third, contrary to at-issue entailments, it is not sensitive to higher operators: for instance, in the polar question (8) the mirative meaning does not fall under the scope of the question operator, in that the surprise import is not being questioned.

(8) Ma domani al mare andate?
    but tomorrow to-the seaside go.2PL
    ‘Are you going to the seaside tomorrow?’

A further test shows that the mirative import belongs to a different dimension of meaning than the at-issue meaning (Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina 2016). This is the challengeability test (see also Peterson 2017):

(9) A: ¿Sabes qué?! ¡A las Maldivas fueron de luna de miel! (Spanish)
    know.2SG what to the Maldives went.3PL.of moon of honey
    ‘You know what?! To the Maldives they went on honeymoon.’

    B: ¡Te equivocas! ¡No es verdad!
    REF. be-wrong.2SG not is truth
    ‘You’re wrong! That’s not true!’

    C: ¡No es nada extraño!
    not is nothing strange
    ‘There’s nothing strange about it!’
    (Cruschina 2019: 138)

In (9) the hearer can express her dissent either to the propositional (at issue) content (9B), while accepting the mirative meaning, or to the mirative (non-at-issue) meaning (9C), while accepting the at-issue content: This shows that the two meanings belong to two different dimensions.

2.1 Joint evaluative commitments

The challengeability test (9) establishes the independence of the mirative import from the at-issue truth-conditional content: this is a property that it shares with expressives, in the sense
of Potts (2007). However, (9C) reveals one further property that is not shared by expressives: the unexpectedness import can be accepted or rejected by the interlocutors; it qualifies as an evaluative commitment of the speaker and, when accepted by the interlocutors, it gives rise to a shared evaluation. Emotive expressives, instead, do not give rise to this type of negotiation. The speaker does not try to get the hearer to share her negative emotional state simply by using an expressive like fucking; moreover, even if the hearer does not react overtly to the use of an expressive, she does not thereby become committed to sharing the relevant emotional state.

Another crucial difference concerns the property that Potts (2007) dubs ‘immediacy’. Note that a hearer can correctly interpret an emotive expressive (e.g. fucking) even if she does not have any other information about the emotional state expressed by the speaker. By contrast, the mirative implicature is interpreted on the basis of a modal base and an ordering source which must be accessible to all the participants: if this condition is not satisfied, MFF is infelicitous.

As argued in detail in Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2016), the speaker resorts to MFF not to indicate that the at-issue proposition is not yet integrated into her store of knowledge, but rather to present this information as new and unexpected with respect to the information state that she shares with the other participants. The mirative implicature is not exclusively anchored to the speaker, but is interpreted with respect to a modal base shared by the conversational participants, i.e. the context set: this is the set of worlds compatible with the common ground information at the point when the proposition is asserted (Stalnaker 1978, 2002). Similarly, the stereotypical ordering source is a conversational background that is mutually assumed to be shared by all participants.

Because of this anchoring to the conversational community, the mirative implicature of MFF does not convey sudden discovery, sudden revelation or realization (Aikhenvald 2012: 437), nor is it subject to the ‘recency restriction’ according to which mirative constructions “are licensed only when the speaker has recently learned the at-issue proposition p” (Rett & Murray 2013: 459). We return to this point in Section 5 below.

Notice that anchoring the mirative implicature to the conversational participants does not make this implicature in any way less conventional, or more context-dependent, than other conventional implicatures. In fact, in Kratzer’s approach the at-issue meaning of a modal depends on a modal base and an ordering source which must be supplied by the context, as is the case for our mirative implicature. From a relativist perspective, Potts’s approach to emotive expressives assumes a contextual judge parameter which is set to the speaker by default. All such meanings remain strictly conventional, notwithstanding the fact that part of their interpretation relies on information provided by the utterance context.

In sum, we concur with Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2016: 26) that the aim of MFF is to give rise to a joint evaluative commitment:

We propose that a commitment whose interpretation is based on (a cloud of) ordering sources qualifies as an evaluative commitment. While the main purpose of informative commitments is to rule out certain possible worlds, the purpose of an evaluative commitment is to signal the (in)congruence between the described state of affairs and a given ideal (stereotypical, bouletic, or what have you). Crucially, the mirative proposition can be negotiated and, when it is accepted by all the interlocutors, it becomes a joint evaluative commitment.

2.2 Syntactization of the conventional implicature

If the mirative meaning associated with MFF is a conventional implicature stemming out from a grammaticalized association between a linguistic form and a special interpretive import, the
next question to be addressed is how this association is linguistically encoded. Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2015) argue for a syntactic encoding of the mirative implicature: it is “conventionally associated with the activation of a left-peripheral functional projection which bears an implicature-triggering feature” and which “depend[s] on the availability of a focus structure [...] in the scope of the implicature trigger” (Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina 2015: 17). This syntactic analysis, couched in a cartographic approach to syntactic structures, is illustrated in (10):

(10) \[\text{FP Force ... [Faip FAl}_{\text{mir}} [\text{FocP YP}_{1+[\text{foc}] Foc}_{0+[\text{foc}]}... [\text{TP ... <YP}_{1} > ... ]]]\]

In line with a T-model of the grammar, this proposal establishes that the mirative implicature is triggered by an active feature in the syntactic structure, which provides specific instructions to the interfaces. More specifically, the implicature is conventionally associated with the activation of a left-peripheral functional projection, which in turn activates the focus projection and thus acts as the syntactic trigger of focus movement.

2.3. Focus fronting vs. exclamatives

The unexpectedness import of MFF is prima facie very close to that conventionally associated with wh-exclamatives. Without going into a detailed analysis of exclamatives, in this section we discuss the differences and similarities between the two structures in Romance, based on the general overview of exclamatives offered in Villalba (2017: 605-619) and on the semantic characterization proposed in Rett (2011).

On the syntactic side, while both structures involve A’-movement, MFF fronts a non-wh-constituent, while in exclamatives, both a wh- and non-wh-constituent can be fronted (see Cruschina et al. 2015 for relevant discussion). There are also three sharp asymmetries. First, exclamatives can host ‘expletive’ negation, i.e. a negation that does not negate the propositional content of the sentence radical, and does not syntactically interfere with A’-movement; by contrast, in MFF negation gives rise to an intervention effect and, to the extent that it is available, is interpreted as regular propositional negation. Second, in main wh-exclamatives the fronted wh-constituent can be optionally followed by the declarative complementizer che, while the latter cannot follow the fronted focus in a main clause, and can only precede it in an embedded declarative clause. Third, in MFF the finite verb must be adjacent to the fronted constituent (Cruschina 2012), while in exclamatives adjacency is not required.

On the semantic side, at least two main differences must be mentioned. First, wh-exclamatives involve abstraction over a degree variable, possibly thanks to a covert degree expression, as argued in detail in Rett (2011); by contrast, in MFF the fronted constituent can denote an entity or a quantifier over a set of entities. Second, in wh-exclamatives the propositional content is entirely presupposed, as shown by the fact that they cannot be used to answer a question. By contrast, in MFF only the existential closure of the background is presupposed (cf. the discussion around (6) above), while the at-issue proposition is asserted (cf. (9C)).

There is, however, one significant point in common in the interpretation of the two structures. Although it is commonly assumed that the mirative import of wh-exclamatives is

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5 This proposal is in line with other recent attempts to a syntactization not only of information-structure categories, but also of other pragmatic notions and properties such as speech acts, conversation participants, perspectives, points of view, discourse roles, expressives, certain types of exclamatives, etc. (see Speas & Tenny 2003, Rizzi 1997, Giorgi 2010, Haegeman & Hill 2013, Hill 2014, Wiltschko 2014, Wiltschko & Heim 2016, Trotzke 2017b, Gutzmann 2019, among others).
expressive and necessarily speaker-anchored, the unexpectedness import of wh-exclamatives can be rejected by the interlocutor in a way exactly parallel to MFF in (9C):\(^7\)

(11) A: ¡Qué cena tan rica ha preparado!
    what dinner so good has prepared
    ‘What a fabulous dinner (s)he prepared!’

B: ¡No es nada extraño! Es un cocinero estupendo.
    not is nothing strange Is a cook fantastic
    ‘That’s not surprising: (s)he is a wonderful cook.’

In this respect, both MFF and exclamatives contrast with emotive expressives like fucking. From our perspective, this difference suggests that exclamatives, like MFF, are interpreted relative to expectations\(^8\) that can be negotiated among the conversational participants;\(^9\) they convey an evaluation that the speaker becomes immediately committed to, but crucially, the addressee is expected to react to it by expressing her (dis)agreement, and thereby conveying the (mis)alignment of her expectations with those of the speaker. On the other hand, the emotional state marked by emotive expressives is purely subjective and not subject to negotiation, as discussed above.

3. DIC and its implicature

The mirative meaning associated with Sicilian DIC is also a parasitic expression of mirativity, in that it contingent upon a structure that is independently available in the language. DIC is a (pseudo-coordination) construction that displays multiple agreement: it comprises of two inflected verbs, the first one a motion verb (i.e. jiri ‘go’, viniri ‘come’, passari ‘come by’ or mannari ‘send’); both are inflected for the same subject agreement features and are connected by the element a.\(^10\)

(12) Vaju a mangiu.
    go.PRS.1SG to eat.PRS.1SG
    ‘I go (to/and) eat./ ‘I’m going to eat.’

DIC has been analyzed as a monoclusal construction with the motion verb behaving as a functional (light) verb (cf. Cardinaletti & Giusti 2001, 2003, Cruschina 2013, Di Caro 2015, 2019a,b). The motion verb has lost its full lexical properties (e.g. the ability to select for

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\(^6\) Indeed, exclamatives are incompatible with perspective markers such as ‘in my view’ (Villalba 2017: 617). The same incompatibility is observed in MFF.

\(^7\) We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.

\(^8\) Expectations are here captured through a modal base and a stereotypical ordering source.

\(^9\) On this type of negotiation see Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2016: 27–31). See also Stephenson (2007), who models a similar negotiation with epistemic modals by exploiting the contextual judge parameter.

\(^10\) The origins and the synchronic status of this element are still somewhat controversial. Since Ascoli (1896, 1901), a long tradition of scholars have considered this element to be as the continuation of the Latin coordinating conjunction AC used in spoken and late Latin (see also Rohlfs 1969: §710, §761, Leone 1973, Sornicola 1976, Cardinaletti & Giusti 2001, Ledgeway 2016, Di Caro 2019a). In this sense, the construction is treated as an instance of pseudo-coordination in several studies (see, e.g., Ledgeway 2016, Di Caro 2019a,b). In most varieties, however, this element is homophonous with the preposition a ‘to’, from Latin preposition AD, and this has been taken as evidence of its embedding function (Manzini & Savoia 2005, Manzini, Lorusso & Savoia 2017). As argued in Cruschina (2013: 271), the etymological origins of this connecting element are immaterial for the synchronic analysis of DIC, insofar as it is now desemanticized and contributes no meaning to the construction.
arguments) but, semantically, DIC still entails movement and physical displacement in most cases, leading to the hypothesis that it has been grammaticalized to a functional verb encoding andative or venitive aspect (Cruschina 2013). The expression of mirativity only concerns a special use of DIC that is limited to the verb go as V1. In this usage, the structure is used in a narrative context to refer to the past. In this section we show that andative DIC and mirative DIC differ in a number of respects.

First of all, in mirative DIC, but not in andative DIC, the original motion meaning of V1 is lost. Due to its movement meaning, which involves a change in the position or location, andative DIC imposes specific requirements on the subject and on the types of predicate that can enter the construction: only intentional agents are allowed, while inanimate subjects or predicates that express an emotion or a feeling are not admitted. Since the motion import is lost with mirative DIC, such requirements do not hold: this is particularly evident in (13) with an inanimate subject, in (14) with a weather predicate, and in (15) which features an emotive predicate.

(13) Travasavu u vinu buanu e dopu un misi ni va
decant.PST.1SG the wine good and after a month me= go.PRS.3SG
a fa a fezza.
to do.PRS.3SG the sediment
‘I decanted the good wine and after a month the wine is made with the dregs.’

(14) Nniddri momentu va a scattia nu temporali.
in that moment go.PRS.3SG to break-out.PRS.3SG a storm
‘In that moment a storm broke out.’

(15) Cuannu u vitti ca sunava nna banna,
when him= see.PST.1SG that play.IMRF.PST.3SG in-the band
vaju a pruvu na gioia!
go.PRS.1SG to feel.PRS.1SG a joy
‘When I saw him play in the band, I felt such a joy!’
(Cruschina 2013: 279)

Second, in its andative meaning, DIC ‘competes’ with an infinitival construction, where the second verb is in the infinitive. Compare (12), repeated here below, and (16):

(12’) Vaju a mangiu.
go.PRS.1SG to eat.PRS.1SG
‘I go (to/and) eat.’/ ‘I’m going to eat.’

[ DIC ]

(16) Vaju a mangiari.
go.PRS.1SG to eat.INF
‘I’m going to eat.’
[ Infinitival construction ]

By contrast, the infinitival construction is not available with a mirative import in the very same context, showing that the mirative meaning is specifically associated with DIC and not just with the motion verb (Cruschina in press). Compare (15) above with (17):
Let us now consider the morphological paradigm and the TAM restrictions. A striking property of DIC, which holds both in its andative and mirative use, is its defective paradigm. It is only available with the 1SG, 2SG, 3SG and the 3PL of the present indicative and with the 2SG of the imperative (see Cardinaletti & Giusti 2001, 2003, Cruschina 2013, Di Caro 2019a, Cruschina & Calabrese in press). Andative DIC can be used in all these cells, while mirative DIC can only be used in the available cells of the present indicative. We assume that the imperative restriction on mirative DIC is a direct consequence of its semantics. Even if it is morphologically present, as already mentioned, mirative DIC is used within a narrative context to foreground an unexpected or surprising event in the past. (As we can see in the examples above, all other verbs are in the past tense.) Andative DIC, by contrast, can only be used with a present reference time (or with an imminent-future value as typical of the present tense).

A further difference between andative and mirative DIC concerns the syntactic distribution. While andative DIC is freely available in embedded clauses, the availability of mirative DIC in the same contexts is much more constrained. Mirative DIC can only be embedded under verbs of saying, as shown in (18):

\[(18) \text{* Cridiva ca / Mi cuntà ca cu tutti ca iddra aviva studiatu believe.IMPF.3SG that me=tell.PST.3SG that with all that she had studied notti e jùarnu, all’ ultimu a professoressa ci va a a night and day at-the end the professor her= go.PRS.3SG to duna nu votu tintu. give.PRS.3SG a mark bad ‘S/he believed that / told me that despite the fact that she had studied day and night, the professor gave her a bad mark.’}\]

From the evidence reviewed above, it clearly emerges that mirative DIC and andative DIC are to be treated as two distinct constructions. It is natural to assume that one derived from the other and, in particular, that mirative DIC derives from andative DIC. Indeed, from a cognitive perspective, the specific use of go to express surprise can be conceived of as movement or distance away from the speaker’s expectations and ideal of normality (see Ross 2016, Cruschina in press).12

We have now a better picture of the properties characterizing mirative DIC, but we still need a detailed analysis of the mirative meaning and of the ‘fake’ present tense. These two issues will be addressed in the next two sections.

11 As for the unavailability of DIC with 1PL and 2PL, Cruschina & Calabrese (in press) propose a morphological account, suggesting that this should not be related to the overall semantics of DIC.

12 The association between a motion verb construction and surprise seems to be rather common cross-linguistically. Most typically, the motion verb go is separated from the main lexical verb by means of a pseudo-coordination (’go and V2’), as in English (Carden & Pesetsky 1977), Swedish (Josefsson 2014) and Spanish (Arnaiz & Camacho 1999) (see De Vos 2005, Ross 2016 and Frazer & Pots 2017 for crosslinguistic comparative overviews). Other motion verb periphrases seem to convey a mirative flavor: the conative construction ‘go to V2’ of British English (Dalrymple & Vincent 2015) and ‘go for V2’ of Sicilian (Cruschina 2018); the narrative infinitival structure ‘go (P) V2 INF’, where the motion verb is followed by a preposition and by an infinitival verb (see Tellier 2015 for French Cruschina in press for Italian); and Spanish vaya introducing an exclamative (see Villalba 2017 and references therein).
3.1 The conventional implicature of DIC

The mirative meaning associated with DIC, as in MFF, can be defined as a conventional implicature (see also Wiklund 2009, Dalrymple & Vincent 2015, Cruschina 2018 for a similar analysis with respect to other constructions). Indeed, both the cancellability test (A2) and the challengeability test (B1-B2) give the expected results:

(19) A1: T’arricùardi? Arrivammu dda, nn’u ristoranti, you=remember.PRS.2SG arrive.PST.1PL there in-the restaurant
  e mi vannu a dunanu na pizza accussì ladia!
  and me.DAT=go.PRS.3PL to give.PRS.3PL a pizza so ugly
  ‘Do you remember? We arrived there, at the restaurant, and they gave me such a bad pizza!’

A2: #Ma un c’era/c’è nenti di stranu.
  ‘But there was/there is nothing strange about it.’

B1: Sbagliaut si! Un jè veru!
  ‘You’re wrong! That’s not true!’

B2: Un c’è nenti di stranu.
  ‘There’s nothing strange about it!’

The pragmatic infelicity of (19A2) shows that the speaker cannot cancel the mirative meaning associated with her previous statement (19A1) without giving rise to a sense of contradiction. The replies in (19B) further shows that the hearer can react to (19A1) either with respect to the at-issue meaning, denying its truth (19B1), or with respect to the non-at-issue mirative meaning, rejecting the surprise import (19B2). These tests show that DIC mirative meaning is a conventional implicature that cannot be denied by the speaker and that belongs to an independent dimension of meaning (cf. § 2).

Note also that, as in MFF, the mirative implicature of DIC is not subject to a ‘recency restriction’, to the effect that the at-issue content has been recently learned by the speaker and/or it is not yet integrated in her doxastic or epistemic state. Recall that DIC refers to a past event: the speaker knows that \( p \) is true at the utterance time and it cannot be unexpected for her, but she presents it as unexpected with respect to the common ground, namely the joint commitments of the conversational community at the moment of utterance. Hence, as with the MFF implicature (cf. § 2), the modal base that is used in DIC, much as in MFF, is the context set (the set of worlds compatible with the common ground information). We return to this point in Section 5 below.

Let us now turn to the ‘fake’ present tense, which represents a key aspect to understanding the overall interpretation of the mirative implicature of DIC.

3.2 The ‘fake tense’ and the syntactic side

In most languages where an element of surprise and unexpectedness is associated with a construction featuring the motion verb go (see fn. 8), this meaning emerges in narrative contexts, talking about the past, sometimes in the narrative present. Similarly, the Sicilian DIC is morphologically present, but clearly refers to a past temporal frame. As a matter of fact, DIC exhibits a defective paradigm and can only be used in the present. The question to be addressed now is therefore: Why the present in Sicilian if the reference time is in the past?
Cruschina (in press) argues that what is actually in the present is the time at which we anchor the modal parameters.

Let us go back to the bad-pizza example in (2)/(19). Let us imagine that at the reference time, when the speaker was at the restaurant and ate the pizza, her expectations had not been violated: she was expecting no better pizza than what she got. A few months later, however, she hears that the same restaurant won a special prize for the best pizza of the year. This piece of information is added to the common ground and changes her expectations, as well as those of the interlocutors. On the basis of these current expectations, the speaker can now felicitously utter the sentence with mirative DIC. This is a clear case of shift of a modal parameter, in the sense of Ippolito (2004). Following Ippolito, Cruschina (in press) argues that the expectations (on the basis of which likelihood is calculated) are anchored not just to a world, but to a world-time pair, and the time coordinate is here provided by present tense. In other terms, fake present tense conveys an “actualized past” in that a past situation is evaluated from the present perspective.

In order to implement this idea, we need some ancillary assumptions about the structure and the compositional interpretation of the inflectional domain, for which we will rely on insights by Ramchand & Svenonius (2014). As a starting point, notice that the fake present tense of mirative DIC clearly involves perfective aspect; in (15), for example, the state of feeling joy is described as concluded (contrary to regular present tense). We assume that the perfective Aspect head combines with the verb phrase; the latter denotes a property of eventualities, and the Aspect head simultaneously binds the eventuality position and conveys that the eventuality is temporally included in a ‘reference situation’. More explicitly:

\[
\text{Pf vP} = \lambda s. (\exists e) \left[ \llbracket vP \rrbracket^s(e) \& \tau(e) \subseteq \tau(s) \right]
\]

where \( \tau(e) \) is the temporal trace function, mapping an event or situation to the corresponding time interval.

We hypothesize that in mirative DIC, the verb that combines with perfective Aspect is the lexical verb V2 (cf. below for more details).

The (regular) present Tense head binds the reference situation to a specific ‘topic situation’ \( s^* \) (see Klein 2008) and adds the information that the topic situation temporally overlaps the utterance time \( t_u \):

\[
\text{T\text{PRES}} = \lambda P_{s^*,t_u}. P(s^*) \& \tau(s^*) \approx t_u
\]

The present tense of mirative DIC also binds the reference situation to a contextually salient topic situation, which is however characterized as past in the preceding discourse; consequently, the interpretation of present tense as in (21) would lead to a contradiction. The hearer can thus infer that the intended interpretation is not a regular present tense, as defined in (21), but rather a mirative present tense: this conveys that the situation type instantiated by the topic situation is unexpected relative to the present common ground of the conversational participants (the modal base) and to the current stereotypical ordering source.

Note that in possibilistic situation semantics (Kratzer 1989), every situation is part of one possible world. Thus, in order to express the unexpectedness of a certain situation type, we need to single out a set of situations across different possible worlds that share with the

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13 On the morphosyntactic structure and mechanisms of DIC that yield double inflection, see Cruschina & Calabrese (in press). As for the semantically vacuous morpheme \( a \) we assume, with Cruschina & Calabrese (in press), that it is an instance of ‘ornamental morphology’, in that it does not have any syntactic or semantic content (see also Cruschina 2013 for its characterization as a desemanticized linker).
topic situation certain relevant facts; for example, in the bad-pizza example, the fact that the relevant group of people is located in the relevant restaurant.

We will dub $C(s^*)$ the set of propositions capturing the relevant facts of the topic situation $s^*$. $CG(t_u)$ is the common ground at the time of utterance, and the intersection of the propositions in it, dubbed $\cap CG(t_u)$, is the context set; $SO(w_u,t_u)$ the stereotypical ordering source anchored to the world and time of utterance. With these ingredients, mirative present tense can be defined as follows:

$$[[T_{\text{MIR}}]] = \lambda P_{s,t}. \quad P(s^*) \bullet \forall w \in \cap CG(t_u)[w \text{ is a maximally normal world w.r.t. } \ SO(w_u,t_u) \rightarrow \neg(\exists s \leq w) [s \in \cap C(s^*) \& s \neq s^* \& P(s)]]^{15}$$

[In prose: the topic situation instantiates the situation type $P$, and in all the most normal accessible worlds at the time of utterance, there is no other situation that is similar to the topic situation as for the relevant facts and that instantiates the situation type $P$.]

In (22), the time of utterance is not exploited to temporally locate the topic situation, but rather to anchor to the present the modal base (the context set) and the stereotypical ordering source in the interpretation of the mirative implicature. Indeed, Aikhenvald (2012: 450, fn 9) notes that in various languages the mirative marker occupies the same slot as the tense marker; we speculate that this is due to the fact that the temporal information introduced by the Tense head is crucially involved in anchoring the mirative meaning.

Recall that the functional verb $go$ featuring in DIC has an original aspectual value (andative aspect), in which it lexicalizes $\text{Asp}_{\text{andative}}$, a low head in Cinque’s (2006) array of modal and aspectual heads where functional verbs (i.e. restructuring verbs) can be merged:

$$[[TP \ T (NegP) \ ... \ Mod_{\text{volition}} \ ... \ Mod_{\text{obligation}} \ ... \ Mod_{\text{permission/ability}} \ ... \ Voice \ ... \ Perce$$

$$\text{ception} \ ... \ \text{Causative} \ ... \ \text{Asp}_{\text{andative}} \ ... [[VP V [vP V_{\text{infinitive}}]]]$$

Since in mirative DIC the functional verb has lost the motion component, it is reasonable to assume that it no longer lexicalizes $\text{Asp}_{\text{andative}}$, but it has undergone reanalysis, so that it lexicalizes the higher functional head $T_{\text{MIR}}$. The lexical verb $V_2$ instead lexicalizes to the extended projections of $vP$ up to the Perfective Aspect Phrase. This process of reanalysis is expected under a grammaticalization approach like the one proposed in Roberts & Roussou (2003), whereby the direction of grammaticalization always implies external merge into higher positions in clause structure. On the semantic side, this constitutes an instance of the diachronic process of pragmaticalization (see Davis & Gutzmann 2015 for discussion). The overall compositional structure of mirative DIC is as follows (omitting irrelevant projections):

$$[[TP \ T_{\text{MIR}}^0 \ [PP \ P_{\text{MIR}}^0 \ vP]]$$

$$V1 \quad V2$$

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14 Cf. the notion of a circumstantial modal base in Kratzer (2012).

15 Following the notation in Potts (2005), the $\bullet$ symbol joins the at-issue content (to the left) to the conventional implicature (to the right).

16 For the French ‘expressive verbs’ aller/venir, Tellier (2015: 188) suggests that they occupy a position within the modal functional domain, but since no specific projection is available in Cinque’s hierarchy, she propose the introduction of a new modal head: “Another possibility would be to add to the hierarchy a new projection, call it $\text{ModP}_{\text{expressive}}$, the head of which would host expressive aller and venir in French.” We want however to keep mirative implicatures distinct from expressives, for the reasons discussed above.
b. $[[\text{PfP}]] = \lambda s.(\exists e) \left( [[\text{vP}}]^{s}(e) \& \tau(e) \subseteq \tau(s) \right)$

\[
[[\text{TP}]] = (\exists e) \left( [[\text{vP}}]^{s}(e) \& \tau(e) \subseteq \tau(s^*) \right) \cdot \forall w \in \cap CG(t_u)[w \text{ is a maximally normal world w.r.t. } SO(w_u,t_u) \rightarrow \neg(\exists s \leq w) \{ s \in \cap C(s^*) \& s \neq s^* \& (\exists e) \left( [[\text{vP}}]^{s}(e) \& \tau(e) \subseteq \tau(s) \right) \}]
\]

The proposed semantics also explains the limited embeddability of mirative DIC, as opposed to andative DIC (cf. example (18) above). Normally, conventional implicatures project beyond the scope of intensional operators, such as attitude verbs, because by hypothesis they belong to a dimension of meaning separate from the at-issue dimension that the intensional operator belongs to. Here, however, if the topic situation gets bound in the scope of an intensional verb such as believe, the event is entailed to occur in all the possible worlds that are doxastically accessible to the matrix subject; as the accessibility relation is not realistic, the set of accessible worlds may well have an empty intersection with the context set $\cap CG(t_u)$. Thus, the set of worlds in which the relevant event occurs is potentially disjoint from the set of worlds with respect to which its likelihood is calculated. While this is not strictly contradictory, we speculate that it is incoherent, in that nothing guarantees that the current stereotypical perspective of the conversational participants is relevant to the worlds doxastically accessible to the matrix clause subject.\(^{17}\)

4. Comparing the two implicatures

We have argued that both in mirative DIC and in MFF, the import of surprise and unexpectedness is associated with the relevant construction as a conventional implicature. The at-issue content of the mirative assertion is already integrated into the speaker’s store of knowledge and need not be recently learned; it is rather presented as new and unexpected for the conversational community. It is true that mirative DIC is typically used to refer to the speaker’s personal experience, giving the impression that the speaker employs it to express her own feelings and emotions. At the same time, however, we argued that the mirative implicature of DIC, as in MFF, is to be interpreted with respect to a modal base and an ordering source shared by the conversational participants, and when accepted by the interlocutor(s), it gives rise to a joint evaluative commitment.

In spite of these common properties, there are also two important differences. Firstly, in DIC, contrary to MFF, no narrow focus is involved. Recall, however, that in our reformulation of the mirative implicature in (6) above, focus does not play any role; the contribution of focus in MFF is to introduce the accommodation of the background, which is thereby implied not to be noteworthy. We can therefore extend our revised definition of the mirative implicature for MFF to mirative DIC:

\(^{17}\) As for embeddability under verbs of saying, we assume that here the embedded clause conveys the ‘main point of the utterance’ in the sense of Simons (2007). According to certain analyses (e.g. Maier & Bary 2015), the main point clause is not actually embedded. For Bianchi & Frascarelli (2017), instead, the exceptional main point status allows the complement clause to be interpreted against a realistic modal base. Either way, the mirative implicature and the at-issue content would be anchored to two compatible (or even identical) sets of worlds.
The at-issue proposition is false in all the most normal worlds of the context set $\cap CG(t_0)$, where the most normal worlds are defined as those worlds in $\cap CG(t_0)$ that are not outranked by any other world in $\cap CG(t_0)$ on the basis of the ordering determined by the present stereotypical ordering source SO(wu,tu).

This definition does not make directly reference to alternative propositions. All that it states is that the asserted proposition $p$ is not true in the maximally normal worlds (in the sense of Portner 2009: 99) and is thus not compatible with the set of expectations (see also Rett & Murray 2013, Simeonova 2015).

The second difference concerns the syntactic position where the mirative implicature is introduced. As discussed in Section 2.2, in the case of MFF the implicature is introduced in the left-periphery of the clause; in DIC, instead, the pseudo-coordination structure that the implicature is associated with belongs in the inflectional domain. This syntactic domain is related to another peculiar feature of mirative DIC, namely ‘fake’ present tense, which we analyzed as a mirative present tense bounding the unexpectedness import to the present common ground of the conversational participants (the modal base) and to the present stereotypical ordering source. The mirative implicature is then associated with the reanalysis from an andative to a mirative meaning and has been conventionally associated with the special (narrative) use to refer to a past time.

Admittedly, the hypothesis that the mirative implicature is introduced by two different functional heads in MFF and in DIC goes against the most radical interpretation of the cartographic approach, whereby a given interpretive import is introduced in one and only one projection in the functional hierarchy. Such a bijective relation, however, is not universally assumed in cartographic studies: witness the hypothesis that both the CP and the vP periphery contain Topic and Focus projections (Belletti 2004 and much related work). We maintain in particular that non-at-issue meanings, such as presuppositions and conventional implicatures, can be hosted by different functional heads, corresponding to different layers of at-issue compositional meaning. ‘Semantic transparency’ then consists in the one-directional mapping of every functional projection into one and only one semantic interpretation (which may comprise both an at-issue and a non-at issue component, as in (22)).

In the case at hand, the TP-level mirative implicature of DIC conveys that the property of situations denoted by the predicative nucleus is not expected to hold of (the counterparts of) the topic situation introduced by T. The CP-level mirative implicature of MFF conveys exactly the same, plus the presupposition that the existential closure of the background is true of the topic situation; this presupposition is conveyed by the focus structure involving the left-peripheral Focus Phrase.

Despite some possible interpretive similarities, MFF should not be assimilated to fronting constructions realizing verum focus (Leonetti & Escandell-Vidal 2009, 2010):

(i) a. Algo debe saber. (Spanish)
   something must.PRS.3SG know
   ‘S/he must know something.’

   b. Poco te puedo decir.
      little to.you can.PRS.1SG say
      ‘Little can I say to you.’

The type of fronting featuring in these structures is not directly related to the (narrow) focalization of the preposed constituent, but is instead a mechanism that introduces focus on the polarity of the sentence. By contrast, polarity does not seem to play any role in MFF, where the focal status of the fronted constituent is confirmed by the fact that it bears the main prominence of the sentence. As argued in this paper, moreover, narrow focus in MFF triggers the existential closure of the background. Polarity does not play any role in DIC either, which is characterized by a default prosodic contour with main prominence at the end of the sentence, and which, in our analysis, derives its mirative interpretation from a temporal – and not a polarity – head.
The properties of the mirative implicature associated with MFF and mirative DIC are summarized in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MFF</th>
<th>mirative DIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of implicature</td>
<td>conventional</td>
<td>conventional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recency restriction</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of commitment</td>
<td>joint evaluative commitment</td>
<td>joint evaluative commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association with focus</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of syntactic encoding</td>
<td>left periphery</td>
<td>inflectional domain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusions: The broader picture

In this paper we analyzed the parasitic mirative meanings associated with two distinct constructions. We have shown that, despite the structural differences – with significant consequences for the syntactic level of encoding – they share important properties. Both in MFF and in DIC, the expression of mirative meaning arises from conventionalized (and grammaticalized) use of a specific structure. Formally, this meaning can be captured as a conventional implicature about the falsity of the at-issue proposition in the most normal worlds. This meaning has an interactional component, in that it is not exclusively anchored to the speaker’s stereotypical perspective, but it also involves the interlocutor(s) in the attempt to arrive at a joint evaluative commitment. In this respect, the mirative implicature discussed here differs significantly from other types of mirative meaning that are described in the literature, starting from DeLancey’s (1997) seminal paper, as anchored exclusively to the speaker.

As a matter of fact, Aikhenvald (2012), in her typological survey, stresses that the anchor of the mirative meaning can vary across languages: it can be the speaker, the addressee, or a third person ‘protagonist’ whose viewpoint is being reported. Aikhenvald also stresses that the mirative meaning can come in different flavors, the main ones being that of ‘sudden discovery or realization’ and that of surprise proper; in some languages these two flavors have a distinct morphosyntactic encoding.

We assume that the core of mirativity is to be captured in terms of the ingredients that we described, i.e. a judgement of unlikelihood based on an information state (a modal base) and a normalcy ideal (a stereotypical ordering source, or a set of expectations). We speculate that at least part of the variation discussed by Aikhenvald and others could be captured in terms of the anchoring of these modal parameters, by adding to the anchoring index an individual (in addition to a world and a time). In particular, we would distinguish two main types of anchoring.

In the first type, which we dub ‘first-person mirativity’, the modal parameters are anchored to the individual whose viewpoint is being reported in the discourse, namely, the individual that bears the logophoric role SELF, in the sense of Sells (1987). We believe that this type of mirativity belongs in the domain of logophoricity. The logophoric SELF role is borne by the speaker as a default (Sells 1987: 456), and this is the reason why this type of mirativity is commonly described as anchored to the speaker.

Anchoring the modal parameters to the speaker, however, gives rise to what Bianchi, Bocci & Cruschina (2016: § 5.1) describe as the mirative paradox: “the expressed proposition cannot be true in all the worlds of the modal base […]. The paradoxical conclusion is that, for the mirative import to be interpretable, the speaker could not believe the proposition that she is asserting”. In our current terms, if the at-issue proposition is true in all the worlds of the
speaker’s doxastic/epistemic state, it is also true in all the most normal worlds in it, hence the mirative implicature would not obtain.

This issue is recognized in some recent formal semantic analyses, and the proposed solution is to shift backwards the modal parameters (or the speaker’s expectations) by anchoring them to a time preceding the time of utterance, the ‘time of learning’ (for two different implementations, see Torres Bustamante 2012 and Rett & Murray 2013). The flavor of ‘sudden discovery’ could then be characterized as the passage from a past doxastic/epistemic state in which the at-issue proposition is undecided (i.e. neither entailed by it nor inconsistent with it) to a subsequent doxastic/epistemic state in which it is positively decided (i.e. entailed by it). From our present perspective, this distancing of the modal parameters is expected to arise only when there is an individual anchor.

First-person mirativity, as tentatively defined here, would share with expressives not only the independence from at-issue truth-conditional content, but also a kind of perspective-dependence. However, we have no elements to pursue the comparison further.

The second type of anchoring is the one that we have been discussing in this paper: the modal parameters are anchored to the world and time of utterance and to the conversational community. Thus, the modal base is identified with the context set, i.e. it is delimited by the information that is already accepted as true by all the interlocutors. The mirative paradox does not arise because in a felicitous assertion, the asserted proposition is undecided in the context set (Stalnaker 1978, 2002), hence it may well be false in the most normal worlds in it (according to the present stereotypical ordering source shared by the interlocutors). Consequently, the modal base need not be ‘shifted backward’ to a past time.

In this case, the unexpectedness import does not contribute to characterizing the perspective of a logophoric SELF, but rather, it aims at establishing a joint evaluative commitment, in the sense of Bianchi, Boci & Cruschina (2016) (cf. § 2.1 above). We therefore dub it ‘evaluative mirativity’. We take it as uncontroversial that the participants in a conversation aim at establishing joint evaluative commitments: e.g., a commitment based on a shared teleological or normative ordering source will play an important role in coordinating action choices among different agents. Less obvious is the relevance of establishing joint stereotypical commitments. Consider, however, that in making a plan, agents typically evaluate the likely outcomes of the possible choices; in this respect, a stereotypical ordering source shared by the conversational participants may also be instrumental in coordinating action choices among them.

In conclusion, this study represents a first step towards the investigation of mirative implicatures as a separate class of non-at-issue meaning. In spite of the differences at the syntax-semantics interface related to the associated construction, mirative implicatures seem to be characterized by specific common properties and could be viewed as a coherent manifestation of mirativity, as opposed to other categories such as evidentials and expressives.

References

19 We borrow the notions of undecidedness and positive decidedness from Farkas (2003, (19)).
20 We could in fact assume that the modal parameters are indexed to the judge contextual parameter (à la Potts), to be identified with the bearer of the logophoric SELF role.


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